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1. Introduction 
Like several other tax reforms in OECD countries, such as the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986, the 1992 
Norwegian tax reform introduced large reductions in marginal tax rates at high income levels. While 
the tax reform of 1992 entailed substantial cuts in the marginal tax rates during the 1990s, the extent to 
which overall tax progressivity declined remains an open question. It depends on the overall mix of 
tax changes, including changes in income deduction thresholds and tax deduction thresholds. The first 
issue I address in this paper therefore concerns tax progressivity changes in the period 1991–99. By 
exploiting information from income tax returns, empirical measures that decribe the trends in tax 
progressivity are derived. Two progressivity indices are applied, and results based on the progressivity 
index that is invariant with respect to tax height, the disproportionality measure (Kakwani, 1977), 
show that tax progressivity fell by 12 per cent from 1991 to 1999, though the decline is somewhat 
smaller according to the index that measures the redistributive effect (Musgrave and Thin, 1948). 
 The main purpose of this paper is to identify the contributions of altered tax-laws on this 
reduction in progressivity. To give an introduction to the approach that is followed, let us consider the 
following representation of tax progressivity: Let T symbolize taxes and X symbolize pre-tax income. 
Then the disproportionality index defines tax progressivity as the degree of concentration of the tax 
burden (when individuals are ranked according to pre-tax income, as denoted by topscript X) 
compared to the inequality of pre-tax income, 
X
T
γ - GX, where GX is the inequality in pre-tax income 
measured by the Gini coefficient and 
X
T
γ  is the concentration coefficient for the distribution of taxes. 
Thus, the decline in tax progressivity may therefore be an effect of widened inequality in pre-tax 
income (GX), or of a fall in the concentration coefficient for tax burdens (
X
T
γ ), or it follows from a 
combination of these two effects. In other words, tax-law changes may both have affected the 
distribution of tax burdens, for a fixed degree of inequality in pre-tax income, and the distribution of 
pre-tax incomes.  
 In accordance with this, the search for empirical evidence is twofold: First, we keep the 
distribution of pre-tax income fixed at a base level and expose it to various tax-laws in the period. By 
applying tax-laws from various years to the same fixed distribution of pre-tax income a number of tax-
law amendments that has contributed to the tax progressivity reduction are identified. This part of the 
analysis is related to work done by Kasten, Sammartino and Toder (1994). 
 Secondly, as it is well known that tax-law changes may affect individuals’ behavior, it is 
important to include the effects on income inequality through behavioral adjustments. For instance, 
lower marginal tax rates might stimulate labor supply and other income-generating activities, which in 
4 
turn influence the distribution of pre-tax income. Recent analyses in the United States of the 
relationship between tax reforms and post-reform income growth (cf., e.g., Lindsey, 1987; Feldstein, 
1995; Auten and Carroll, 1999; Moffitt and Wilhelm, 2000; Gruber and Saez, 2002) indicate that 
lower marginal tax rates affect pre-tax incomes, though they do vary with respect to the strength of 
this relationship. These studies
1
 treat tax reforms as "natural experiments" and utilize variations in 
marginal tax rates and observations of incomes before and after reforms to identify the tax 
responsiveness of income. In the present analysis a panel data set that contains information on incomes 
and taxes for a number of individuals for each year during the period 1991–99 is employed. Longer 
post-reform panel data denotes a rich source of information, that allows us to address the long-term 
effects of the reform, and is also helpful in order to specify instruments for changes in marginal tax 
rates. The results with respect to the effect of marginal tax rates on pre-tax incomes are reported in 
terms of elasticity estimates of the relationship between gross income and the net-of-tax rate, where 
the net-of-tax rate is one minus the marginal tax rate.  
 The plan of the paper is as follows: I give a brief description of the main features of the 
Norwegian tax system and the changes it went through during the 1990s in Section 2. The 
measurement of tax progressivity over time represents a challenge inasmuch as the information is 
derived from income tax returns. The major problem is that definitions of income and taxes typically 
follow prevailing tax-law definitions, and these definitions change. Therefore, corrections have been 
made to establish comparable measures of tax progressivity over time, and these are discussed in 
Section 3, before providing estimates of the trend in tax progressivity 1991–99. In Section 4 the effects 
of tax changes with respect to the distribution of the tax burden are analyzed in terms of a fixed-
income approach, while Section 5 reports results of various panel data regressions in order to identify 
the relationship between lower marginal tax rates and the increased inequality in pre-tax incomes. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 In summary, the study found a rise in the inequality of pre-tax income in the period, 
which was not accompanied by an increase in the concentration of tax burdens sufficient to maintain 
the level of tax progressivity. Tax changes that have led to progressivity reductions, for a fixed level of 
pre-tax income inequality, are identified, such as the 1992 tax reform and the deficient adjustments of 
income deduction thresholds. Moreover, elasticities of gross income with respect to net-of-tax rates in 
the range from 0 to approximately 0.2 are found. These results are in accordance with the main 
findings in Aarbu and Thoresen (2001), and suggest that effects of behavioral adjustments to lower 
marginal tax rates at high income levels are likely to have had a relatively small effect or no effect on 
pre-tax income inequality.  
                                                     
1 Which belong to a sizeable literature characterized by Goolsbee (2000) as the New Tax Responsiveness literature.  
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2. A brief outline of the Norwegian tax system 
The period under consideration began with the implementation of the 1992 tax reform – a major 
change in taxation. The reform entailed the adoption of a dual income tax system (cf. Sørensen, 1998), 
with a single basic tax rate at 28 per cent for both capital and labor. In addition, wage income and 
incomes from self-employment are subject to a social security tax and a two-tier surtax. Compared to 
the tax system before 1992, the reform involved substantial reductions in top marginal tax rates both 
for employees and for self-employed taxpayers. The reform widened the gap between statutory capital 
income taxation and taxation of income from labor and self-employment. It also involved an 
imputation method for income from self-employment and income from closely held private 
corporations.
2
 Broadly speaking, this method aims at splitting total income from a business into an 
imputed labor income part and a capital income part (which is why it is sometimes called "the split 
model"). The capital income part is found by multiplying the book value of tangibles with a risk-
adjusted interest rate, while the residual income is classified as imputed labor income. The reform 
changed taxation of dividends from double taxation at both the corporate and individual level to 
taxation of corporations alone. In order to ease distributional effects, the standard deductions were 
increased after the reform.  
 In Figure 1, pre-reform marginal tax rates (1991) for wage income
3
 in Norwegian kroner 
(NOK) are compared to marginal tax rates in 1992, 1995 and 1999. In order to make the tax systems 
for various years comparable, the thresholds have been adjusted by the increase in the average wage in 
the period.
4
 As seen in the figure, the period after the reform has also involved some adjustments in 
the tax system. 
                                                     
2 If the owner or owners actively participate in the operations of the business and own more than two thirds of the shares, 
they are liable for taxation by the rules for closely held corporations. 
3 The tax function for the self-employed is more complicated, but will basically show the same pattern with respect to time as 
Figure 1. 
4 This method of inflation level adjustments is in accordance with current practice by tax bureaucrats. 
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Figure 1. Marginal tax rates on wage income in 1991, 1992, 1995 and 1999. Wage adjusted 
thresholds (1 USD≈7 NOK, Jan. 2004) 
 
3. Tax progressivity 1991-1999 – measures and measurement 
problems 
3.1 Comparisons across households and over time  
This section provides empirical measures of the trend in tax progressivity in the period from 1991 to 
1999 based on micro data from Statistics Norway’s Income Distribution Survey. The Income 
Distribution Survey is a yearly sample-based survey comprising information from income tax returns 
and social security registers. However, before proceeding, I describe the steps that were taken to make 
incomes and taxes comparable both across households and across time. First, with respect to the 
comparability across households of different sizes, income is measured by equivalent income, which is 
derived by aggregating income over household members, weighing with an equivalence scale, and 
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letting each household be represented with as many persons as there are household members.
5
 The 
economies of scale in households are represented by the square root of the number of household 
members.  
 Next, when comparing income and taxes over time, we need to overcome a major 
difficulty associated with data derived from income tax returns. While income tax returns are an 
important source of information for studies of income inequality in several countries, among them the 
Nordic countries and the U.S., the problem with data from government registers is that they often 
reflect the bureaucratic purpose of collecting them. For instance, observed differences in income over 
time might simply reflect changes in income definitions. In reform periods, in particular, one should 
carefully explore whether income and taxation measures at different stages are comparable and the 
extent to which they reflect changing accounting rules. Pre-tax income includes wage income, income 
from self-employment, capital income including dividends, and a number of tax-free benefits such as 
the child benefit, housing benefits, social security benefits. Interest expenses, such as those accruing 
from house purchases, are not deducted due to the undervaluation of imputed income from owner-
occupied homes in our data. The individual tax burdens are derived from tax-benefit model 
calculations. The deviation between these estimates and actual taxation is negligible. 
 The following adjustments are made in order to construct comparable measures in the 
period:  
• Even if important base-broadening initiatives were taken in the period prior to the 1992 tax reform, 
the tax reform implied changes in tax bases. For instance, post-reform income from self-
employment is adjusted with respect to altered tax depreciation rates. 
• Some gains from realizations, for instance from selling shares, were not taxable before the reform 
and are therefore not included in taxable gross income for 1991. A symmetric treatment implies 
that neither gains nor losses are included in 1991, while both are included in measures for the 
period 1992–99. Self-employment losses are treated similarly. 
• Typically, the number of tax-exempt income components represented in the data increase over time 
due to improved access to information. Only income components that are present in data in each 
year in the period are included in the series.  
• There are reasons to expect altered corporate behavior in response to tax reforms (Gordon and 
Mackie-Mason 1994; Gordon and Slemrod 2000). For instance, the reform of 1992 might have 
altered incentives to pay out dividends or retain earnings. Fjærli and Aaberge (2000) show that 
while post-reform total return to shares is more or less in accordance with an estimated long-term 
real rate of return, this is not the case in the pre-reform period. Hence, in order to avoid income 
                                                     
5 Similar to what Ebert (1997, p. 235) describes as Method 3. 
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reporting changes impacting on results, the figures for 1991 and 1992
6
 are adjusted with respect to 
the average ratio between actual income from dividends and the (imputed) return on shares that 
follows from the long-term rate of return (Table 5 in Fjærli and Aaberge, 2000).   
3.2 Tax progressivity indices 
The distributional effect of taxes is often characterized by global measures of tax progressivity, cf. 
Lambert (1993a).
7
 A global measure of tax progressivity refers to the interaction between the tax 
system and the pre-tax income distribution to which it applies. Here two familiar Gini-based indices of 
tax progressivity are applied, the disproportionality measure and the redistributive effect. As noted in 
Section 1, the disproportionality measure (ΠD) (Kakwani, 1977), can be seen as 
 
(3.1) Π = −X
D T X
Gγ , 
 
where GX is the inequality in pre-tax income measured by the Gini coefficient and 
X
T
γ is the 
concentration coefficient for the distribution of taxes, when individuals are ranked by pre-tax income, 
as indicated by the top script X. ΠD will equal zero when the distribution of tax burdens is identical to 
the distribution of pre-tax income. 
 Various measures of tax progressivity can give contradictory results.
8
 One important 
characteristic of the disproportionality measure is that it is scale invariant, in the sense that it is not 
affected by changes in tax revenue. This contrasts with the redistributive effect (Musgrave and Thin, 
1948), ΠR, which can be defined as  
 
(3.2) Π = −
R X Y
G G , 
 
where GY is the inequality in post-tax income measured by the Gini coefficient. The redistributive 
effect measures tax progressivity by comparing the distribution of pre-tax income to the distribution of 
after-tax income. Contrary to the disproportionality measure, the redistributive effect draws its 
component parts from two (generally) disparate rankings of individuals. When the inequality in the 
distribution of after-tax income equals the inequality in the distribution of pre-tax income, the 
                                                     
6 1992 incomes are adjusted because of the one-year lag between the accounting year and the year in which the households 
receive dividends. 
7 Lambert (1993a) makes a distinction between tax progression and tax progressivity, where the former refers to local 
measures. Both local and global measures are found in the seminal work of Musgrave and Thin (1948). 
8 Relying on summary measures of inequality is another source of uncertainty, since it must imply some sort of aggregation. 
Cf. Bishop et al. (1997) for a study that employs dominance measures of progressivity, i.e. comparisons of Lorenz-curves. 
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redistributive effect will equal zero.
9
 Kakwani (1984) has demonstrated a connection between the two 
progressivity measures, the disproportionality measure and the redistributive effect:  
 
(3.3)  − = Π − − = Π − 
XT T
X Y D Y Y D P
Y Y
G G G r
µ µ
γ
µ µ
, 
 
where µT and µY are mean tax and mean after-tax income, respectively, and 
X
Y
γ shows the 
concentration of after-tax income when units are ranked according to pre-tax income. Equation (3.3) 
shows that the difference between the disproportionality measure and the redistributive effect is that 
the latter contains an expression both for tax level (µT/µY) and for the extent of reranking, defined by 
= −
X
p Y Y
r G γ . Reranking refers to the fact individuals change places in the income ranking in 
consequence of the tax system, in the changeover from pre-tax income to post-tax income. The index 
rP measures the degree of reranking as the difference between the distributions of post-tax income 
when units are ranked according to post-tax income and pre-tax income, respectively. 
3.3 Tax progressivity in Norway 1991-99 
Table 1 shows the trend in tax progressivity 1991–99, as measured by disproportionality and the 
redistributive effect. It also shows estimates for the reranking measure. We see that the inequality in 
pre-tax income rose by about 6 per cent in the period under consideration, while the concentration of 
tax payments remained largely unaltered and the inequality in post-tax income widened by about 8 per 
cent. The bottom two lines of Table 1 show that this gives a reduction in tax progressivity, as 
evaluated by both progressivity indices. However, the disproportionality measure shows a stronger 
reduction in tax progressivity in comparison to the evaluation by the redistribution measure, 12 per 
cent and 7 per cent, respectively. Due to the large number of observations in each year the reduction is 
significant by both measures.
10
 Thus, a reasonable interpretation of the results from Table 1 is that we 
are seeing a notable but modest reduction in tax progressivity from 1991 to 1999.  
 The disparate evalutions by the two measures of tax progressivity are due to two factors, 
as mentioned above. First, the disproportionality measure is unaffected by changes in tax revenue, 
while the decrease in the redistributive effect is dampened by the increase in tax revenue from 1991 to 
1999, cf. equation (3.3). Figure 2 shows that tax revenues rose significantly in the period under 
investigation. In total, the authorities collected about 50 per cent more taxes in 1999 than in 1991. 
                                                     
9 Thus, the redistributive effect is unaltered with respect to a proportional change in the distribution of post-tax incomes, 
while the disproportionality measure is unaffected by a proportional change in the distribution of the tax burden. 
10 Cf. discussion in Bishop, Formby and Zheng (1998) on tax progressivity indices and statistical inference.   
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Second, the tax system as it was in 1999 caused fewer individuals to change positions in the transition 
from pre-tax to post-tax income than the tax system in operation in 1991. In other words, the reranking 
effect of the tax system diminished in the period, as seen by measures of the reranking effect in Table 
1.  
 
Table 1.  Tax progressivity measured by disproportionality and the redistributive effect, 1991–
99. Equivalent income. Number of observations in parentheses 
 
1991 
(24,446) 
1992 
(24,010) 
1993 
(18,404)
1994 
(41,112)
1995 
(21,873)
1996 
(37,980)
1997 
(39,504) 
1998 
(38,938) 
1999 
(26,825)
1991–
99 
(%) 
Inequality in pre-
tax income, GX 
0.276 0.280 0.286 0.294 0.288 0.298 0.303 0.292 0.293 +6.1 
Tax burden 
concentration, 
X
T
γ  
0.416 0.419 0.422 0.425 0.416 0.424 0.427 0.410 0.416 +0.5 
Inequality in post-
tax income, GY 
0.235 0.242 0.247 0.254 0.249 0.259 0.262 0.254 0.255 +8.4 
Reranking effect, 
rp 
0.004 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 -13.7 
Redistributive 
effect, ΠR 
0.041 0.038 0.039 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.038 0.038 -7.2 
Disproportionality, 
ΠD 
0.140 0.139 0.136 0.131 0.128 0.126 0.124 0.118 0.121 -12.0 
 
As noted in Section 2, the tax reform of 1992 abolished the double taxation of dividends; dividends are 
now taxed at the corporate level only.
11
 There is support in the tax incidence literature to argue that 
these taxes should be assigned to individuals. Table A1 in the Appendix shows tax progressivity 
measures when taxes paid on dividends in the corporate sector are allocated to the individuals.
12
 Table 
A1 shows that tax progressivity measured by disproportionality under this alternative definition of the 
tax burden fell in the period, however, at a smaller rate than indicated by measures reported in Table 1. 
Table A1 also shows that according to the redistributive effect progressivity increased in the period, 
which signifies previous reports on various progressivity measures contain conflicting results. 
 
                                                     
11 However, this is a highly debated issue, and most likely we will see a return of the double taxation system in the future. 
12 In post-reform years this can be done straightforwardly by noting that the dividends received by the individual are net of 
taxes (28 per cent flat rate) paid by the firms. In pre-reform years the taxation of dividends in the corporate sector depend on 
variables not present in the data. Hence, for these years corporate taxes on dividends are imputed by applying a factor for 
average taxation of profits in firms, based on findings in Askildsen and Fjærli (1989).  
11 
Figure 2.  Income tax revenues, taxation of individuals 1991–99 in nominal prices and 1999-
prices. In million Norwegian kroner (1 USD≈7 NOK, Jan. 2004) 
 
Following Pfähler (1987), Formby, Smith and Thistle (1990) and Lambert (1993b), it can be argued 
that tax progressivity evaluations over time are best understood in a revenue-neutral setting. If 
estimates for the redistributional effects were adjusted with respect to tax revenue differences, the 
evaluation by the redistributional effect would be closer to the evaluation by disproportionality. Only 
the effect from reranking would lead to divergences.  
 As stated above, the main purpose of this paper is to generate knowledge concerning the 
relationship of tax changes to decreased tax progressivity. Musgrave and Thin (1948) have suggested 
that "the less equal the distribution of income before tax, the more potent will be a (given) progressive 
tax structure in equalizing income" (p. 510). If this prediction has any significance,
13
 there must have 
been some tax changes in the period that weakened the progressivity effect of the tax system. Why, in 
other words, was the more unequal distribution of pre-tax income not followed by an even more 
unequal distribution of taxes? Optimal tax theory, for instance, predicts that growing inequality (of 
pre-tax income) would lead to increased progressivity (Slemrod and Bakija, 2000; Sandmo, 2002).  
 The next sections explore in detail the relationship between tax changes and the observed 
fall in ΠD =
X
T
γ - GX from 1991 to 1999. The search for evidence is divided into separate analyses of 
the relationship between tax changes and the development in 
X
T
γ (for a fixed distribution of X) and the 
effects from tax changes on GX. 
                                                     
13 Lambert and Pfähler (1992) and Milanovic (1994) discuss to what extent it really has.  
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4. Fixed-income calculations 
To see how tax changes affected the distribution of tax burdens, a "fixed-income" approach to tax 
progressivity measurement is applied.
14
 While keeping pre-tax income inequality constant, we employ 
a tax-benefit model for Norway to calculate taxation in respect of various tax-laws.
15
 By letting the 
same pre-tax income distribution be exposed to taxation as per various tax-laws in the period, the 
(direct) contribution from tax changes can be identified. When tax regulations diverge from the point 
of time of the pre-tax income distribution, they are inflated or deflated to match the pre-tax income 
distribution by a factor based on developments in wage per normal man-year. This means that all 
thresholds, including income deduction thresholds
16
 and tax deduction thresholds, are adjusted by the 
wage growth. The distribution of pre-tax income will be unaffected by the application of tax 
regulations for different years, apart from the effect of the child benefit. The child benefit is included 
in pre-tax income and is calculated according to the regulations applicable to various years. Since the 
simulations are not revenue-neutral, progressivity estimates only for the measure that is unaffected by 
tax height, the disproportionality measure, are presented. Note that the results in general are not 
independent of the choice of base year.
17
 
 A number of tax-law changes might have contributed to the observed reduction in tax 
progressivity. Table 2 explores the effects from a selection of tax changes. Table 2 is divided 
structurally into effects of the 1992 tax reform and effects from post-reform tax system adjustments. 
While the results in Table 2 indicate that none of the progressivity-dampening tax-law changes 
resulted in large changes in the degree of progressivity, as measured here, there are some notable 
effects. 
 Let us first address the effect of the 1992 tax reform.
18
 We do so by deflating the tax-law 
of 1992 to the 1991 level, and contrasting the simulation results of the (deflated) 1992 tax-law on 1991 
incomes with the results of a simulation where 1991 incomes are taxed by 1991 rules. Letting 1991 
incomes be taxed by the 1992 tax-law is not straightforward; it means, for instance, that the split 
model is calculated on a pre-reform data set. However, the simulation exploits that data for 1991 were 
collected with respect to new income concepts of the 1992-reform.  
                                                     
14 Cf. Kasten, Sammartino and Toder (1994) for an application of this method when evaluating the trend in U.S. tax 
progressivity 1980–93, and Decoster and Van-Camp (2001) and Johnson and Webb (1993) for related approaches when 
discussing reforms in the Belgian tax system and trends in income inequality in the U.K, respectively. 
15 Sutherland (1995) gives descriptions of tax-benefit models. 
16 Fixed amount or a fixed share of income that is deducted in order to arrive at taxable income, sometimes called allowances 
or exemptions.  
17 Cf. the approach suggested by Dardanoni and Lambert (2002) to establish a common baseline or a reference situation, from 
which one can determine the tax progressivity orderings of intertemporal tax schemes.  
18 Section 2 provides a more detailed exposition of the reform. 
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 We saw in Table 1 that tax progressivity, as measured by disproportionality, fell from 
0.140 in 1991 to 0.139 in 1992. Our calculations indicate that the isolated direct effect of tax 
legislation amendments was a stronger reduction in progressivity, from 0.140 to 0.135. More elaborate 
simulations show that the cause can be found in the tax rate reductions (Aarbu and Thoresen, 1997). A 
natural follow-up hypothesis would be that the increases in standard deductions have not quite 
managed to make up for the rate reductions. 
  
Table 2. Fixed-income calculations of tax progressivity effects of tax-law changes. Tax-benefit 
model simulations 
 Fixed-income simulations   
Progressivity measured by 
disproportionality 
Wage-deflated 1992 tax-law 
applied to 1991 incomes 
0.135 
Effect of the tax reform 
Baseline: 1991 tax-law applied to 
1991 incomes  
0.140 
The 1992 split model applied to 
1999 incomes  
0.123 
Wage-inflated 1992 tax-law 
applied to 1999 incomes, except 
adjustments in the split model  
0.126 
As above, except that only 1992 
allowances wage-inflated to 1999 
0.127 
Wage-inflated 1992 tax-law 
applied to 1999 incomes, except 
adjustments in the split model and 
the child benefit 
0.125 
Effects of post-reform 
changes 
Baseline: 1999 tax system applied 
to 1999 incomes 
0.121 
 
With respect to effects of post-reform changes in the tax system, various simulations are carried out on 
the basis of the 1992 tax-law in order to identify the sources of the decreasing progressivity of that 
period. These simulation results are to be compared with the baseline simulation result at 0.121 (1999 
tax system applied to 1999 incomes, cf. bottom line of Table 2). A number of tax policy changes in the 
period are addressed. 
 Firstly, the split model was modified after its introduction in 1992. Most importantly, it 
was adjusted with respect to the maximum values for the imputed labor income part of overall income 
(cf. the presentation of the Norwegian tax system in Section 2). By employing the 1992 split model on 
1999 incomes and comparing the degree of tax progressivity according to this simulation with the 
baseline result, we can identify the effect of this tax-law change. The figures in Table 2 indicate a 
14 
minor effect. If the 1992 version of the split-model had been utilized in 1999, tax progressivity would 
have increased to 0.123, compared to 0.121 in the baseline. 
 Secondly, annual amendments in tax legislation are based on predictions of wage income 
rises for the following year. Since these predictions constantly underestimate the actual rise in wages, 
there is reason to assess the effects of this procedure. Table 2 shows that if the 1992 tax-law (not 
including the 1992 split model) had been adjusted by the actual wage growth in the period, tax 
progressivity would have increased to 0.126. 
 Thirdly, to further elaborate on the effect of adjusting tax-laws according to low wage 
growth predictions, tax progressivity under the condition that only allowances are adjusted according 
to the actual wage growth is shown in Table 2. Then, as expected, tax progressivity increases more 
than in the previous example, to 0.127. 
 Fourth, Table 2 also indicates that the isolated effect of not adjusting the child benefit in 
accordance with real wage growth played a part in reducing tax progressivity; compare simulations 
with and without child benefit adjustments. 
 To sum up so far, the fixed-income calculations have identified a number of tax-law 
changes that had tax progressivity reducing effects, that is, our simulations show progressivity 
enhancing effects of not amending taxation legislation as was done. For instance, it is shown that both 
the tax reform of 1992 and the persistent underestimation of wage growth when inflating tax-laws 
have had an effect.  
5. Tax changes and effects on the distribution of pre-tax income 
5.1 Empirical strategy to identify behavioral effects 
I argued above that the tax system progressivity decreased from 1991 to 1999. On the basis of several 
tax-benefit model simulations, certain tax changes were identified as contributive factors. The next 
question concerns how tax changes affected inequality in pre-tax income over the period. There are 
reasons to assume that lower taxation at the margin causes individuals to increase their income. Even 
though there might be some undetermined relationship between increasing inequality in equivalent 
household income and responses to tax changes, it can be argued, as Auten and Carroll (1999) do, that 
strong behavioral responses in an era of rate reductions at high income levels induce increased 
dispersion. Here, I address the relationship between pre-tax income growth and the net-of-tax rate
19
 on 
basis of information from a panel data set for the period 1991–99. In order to control for effects of 
                                                     
19 Remember that the net-of-tax rate is one minus the marginal tax rate. 
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other factors that might have contributed to the increase in pre-tax income inequality a number of 
other individual characteristics are included in the regressions.  
 The present analysis is related to the approach taken by Aarbu and Thoresen (2001), who 
utilized panel data information and employed the differences-of-differences estimator in order to 
identify effects of the Norwegian tax reform. Aarbu and Thoresen (2001) followed closely Feldstein’s 
(1995) approach, comparing incomes in 1991 and 1994 for the same individuals, and dividing the 
taxpayers into an "experiment group" and a "treatment group", under the assumption that the tax 
reform constituted a "natural experiment".  
 Now, with a longer series of panel data at hand, the information on taxpayers’ behavior 
over a longer time period can be examined, without relying on information from arbitrarily chosen 
years after the reform. Thus, in the present analysis post-reform behavior is represented by information 
on incomes at several points of time after the reform, since it exploits information from panel data 
covering the period 1991–99. These data will also reflect behavioral adjustments, if any, with respect 
to post-reform net-of-tax rate modifications, as seen in Figure 1.
20
  
 It is assumed that the following linear approximation can be applied in order to let pre-tax 
income, X, for individual i at time t to be explained by k regressors, taxes included, Zit, in addition to 
an unobservable individual effect, δi, a time effect, λt, and a constant, α, 
 
(5.1) 1,..., ; 1,...,= + + + + = =
it it i t it
X Z u i N t Tα β δ λ . 
 
The main approach in the New Tax Reponsiveness literature is to estimate a first differenced version 
of 5.1 in order to eliminate the unobserved individual effect, following Feldstein (1995). The 
dependent variable is therefore the change in income between periods, for instance between pre-
reform and post-reform years. A significant problem is that the tax variable is non-exogenous, i.e. the 
tax variable is correlated with the error term of a first differenced setup of (5.1) since taxation is 
jointly determined with income (Moffitt and Wilhelm, 2000). This problem is often addressed by 
employing instrumental variable methods. Feldstein (1995) used the first period marginal tax rate 
levels as instrument, but this method might be sensitive to regression to the mean biases, caused by 
correlation between the instrument and the first differenced error term, for instance because some 
individuals erroneously are defined as high-income earners in the first period, due to temporary swings 
in income. Control for mean reversion had a large impact on elasticity estimates in Aarbu and 
Thoresen (2001), and similar findings are reported in studies based on U.S. data; see Auten and  
                                                     
20 There have also been some adjustments of net-of-tax rates for self-employed tax-payers. 
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Carroll (1999) and Gruber and Saez (2002). The longer series of panel data permit employing 
specifications that address the joint problem of validity of retention rate instruments and mean 
reversion controls, and this study employs 3 different specifications in order to derive elasticity 
estimates. The alternative approaches can be described by considering a first differenced version of 
equation (5.1). In equation (5.2) the difference between income in period 2 and income in period 1 in 
log form is the dependent variable, while period 1 and period 2 net-of-tax rates are represented by (1-
τ1) and (1-τ2), respectively:  
 
(5.2) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] εγττηκ ++−−+= RXX
1212
11loglog . 
 
Thus, η measures the elasticity of pre-tax income with respect to changes in net-of-tax rates. The time 
effect is embedded in the constant term, κ, other explanatory variables are symbolized by R, while ε 
represents the first differenced error term.
21
 
 The 3 different methods of deriving estimates of η are briefly as follows. In the first 
specification the difference between average post-reform income in the period 1992–99 and pre-
reform income (1991) is employed as the dependent variable, corresponding to log(X2 /X1) in equation 
(5.2). Further, log[(1-τINS)/(1-τ1991)] is used as instrument for the net-of-tax rate change, where τ1991 is 
the marginal tax rate in 1991 calculated on basis of 1991 incomes, while τINS is the marginal tax rate 
that follows from letting the individuals' 1991 incomes be adjusted to the 1992 level and taxed 
according to the tax rules of 1992, similar to approaches in Auten and Carroll (1999), Aarbu and 
Thoresen (2001), Gruber and Saez (2002). The problem of mean reversion is controlled for by adding 
initial income as an independent variable, as suggested by Moffitt and Wilhelm (2000). This 
specification aims at identifying the effects of the reform of 1992, also in a longer perspective. 
 The second specification utilizes that we have seen adjustments in the net-of-tax rates 
also after the reform (cf. Figure 1 above), letting six 3-year differences in income, 1991–1994, 1992–
1995, …, and 1996–1999, be explained by differences in retention rates for the same years, 
respectively. 3-year differences are often seen in the literature. Moreover, a net-of-tax rate instrument 
that might be less sensitive to mean reversion is employed. Here, following Carroll (1998), the 
individual average gross income in the period 1991–99 serves as basis for the marginal tax rate 
calculations in each year in order to establish tax rate instruments. For instance, log[(1-τAVE91)/(1-
τAVE94)] is employed as instrument for the tax change between 1991 and 1994, where τAVE91 is the 
marginal tax rate the individual would face in 1991 in terms of his "permanent income", which is 
proxied by his average income 1991–1999, while τAVE94 is the marginal tax rate that he would face in 
17 
1994, based on the same income concept. As one cannot rule out that this instrument correlates with 
the first period transitory component, as noted by Kopczuk (2003), log of first period income is 
included as mean reversion control.
22
 Time dummies are included in this specification.  
 The third specification follows the approach suggested by Gruber and Saez (2002). The 
dependent variable is six 3-year differences in income, 1991–1994, 1992–1995,…, and 1996–1999, as 
in the second specification. The tax change instrument is however log[(1-τINS2)/(1-τ1)], where τ1 is the 
marginal tax rate in the first year, while τINS2 is the marginal tax rate in year 2, based on first year 
income. τINS2 is calculated by letting the individuals' incomes in the first year be adjusted to the level of 
the second year and taxed according to the tax rules of the second year. Gruber and Saez (2002) argue 
that it is important to control for nonlinearities in the first period mean reversion control, and by 
employing information from a number of years of data, one can add a spline function based on first 
year income, and still be able to identify tax effects.
23
 A 10-piece spline, describing the individuals' 
positions in the first period income ranking, is therefore included, in addition to the mean reversion 
control (log of first period income). Dummies are included as time controls.      
 In accordance with numerous studies from the U.S. (Feldstein, 1995; Auten and Carroll, 
1999; Moffitt and Wilhelm, 2000; Gruber and Saez, 2002),
24
 and since Aarbu and Thoresen (2001) did 
not reject a small positive elasticity, one expects to find a positive relationship between the net-of-tax 
rate and pre-tax income growth.   
 A number of other variables are included in addition to the net-of-tax rate variable, in 
order to control for the observed heterogeneity. As many of them do not vary over time, the initial 
period (1991) characteristics
25
 are included in the first-differenced equation. The relationship between 
income and the time-invariant variables might have changed in the period and may therefore have 
contributed to the income inequality growth. The time-invariant variables include: education; age; age 
squared; a dummy variable for the sex of the taxpayer that takes the value 1 if the individual is a 
female; an Oslo-area dummy variable that covers inhabitants in the capital and the neighboring 
municipalities; a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the individual is self-employed; a dummy 
variable that takes the value 1 if the individual received dividends in 1991; and net wealth.
26
 Time-
variant measures are employed for the variables representing the number of children aged 0–3 years; 
                                                                                                                                                                      
21 Note that the individual level notation is suppressed in equation (5.2). 
22 However, as expected, results are less dependent on whether the mean reversion control is included or not. 
23 They argue that this also controls for a trend towards increased income inequality in the U.S., in addition to mean reverting 
effects. Such an interpretation cannot be justified with respect to Norway, as a persistent trend towards more disparate 
incomes has not been verified. 
24 However, there are studies from the U.S. that report small elasticity estimates, cf. the survey in Gruber and Saez (2002, p. 
5). 
25 Values for 1992 is employed for the variable representing education.  
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the number of children aged 4–9 years; the number of children aged 10–16 years; and the marital 
status of the taxpayers.  
5.2 Data 
For this part of the analysis a subsample of individuals participating in the yearly Income Distribution 
Survey were entered into a panel spanning 1991–1999. The analysis is restricted to prime aged 
individuals, as is usually the case in studies of incomes over time, cf. e.g. Feldstein (1995) and 
Burkhauser, Holtz-Eakin and Rhody (1997); taxpayers aged 25–55 years in the period 1991–1999. 
The panel contains information concerning about 2,150 individuals. To avoid including individuals 
that basically get their incomes from pensions, the sample is restricted with respect to source of 
income. After excluding individuals who have divorced during the period and one very high income 
observation, and restricted the sample to individuals with income above 10,000 NOK in period 1, then 
the resulting panel consists of about 1,500 wage earners or self-employed individuals, observed over 9 
years.  
 The dependent variable in the analysis, the difference is pre-tax income, is approximated 
by the difference in gross income, where gross income includes wage income, income from self-
employment, and capital income, including capital gains and losses.
27
 Income is inflated to the 1999 
level by the average wage growth in the period. Table 3 shows year-specific means for this gross 
income concept and actual marginal tax rates in the sample.   
 
Table 3.  Year-specific means for gross income (NOK) and actual marginal tax rates (%) in 
panel, 1991–99. Income inflated to the 1999 level by the average wage growth (1 
USD≈7 NOK, Jan. 2004). Standard deviations in parentheses   
 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
Gross 
income 
(NOK)  
311,707 
(181,685) 
313,310 
(168,942) 
311,402 
(175,437)
315,385 
(194,347)
320,140 
(210,447)
321,686 
(190,134)
330,475 
(250,352) 
331,750 
(194,577)
335,146 
(229,952)
Marginal 
tax rate 
(%) 
44.6 
(10.3) 
40.9 (7.6) 41.5 (8.1) 42.1 (8.0) 42.7 (7.6) 43.0 (7.4) 42.7 (7.5) 42.8 (7.4) 42.5 (7.6)
 
                                                                                                                                                                      
26 Note that the wealth variable is truncated at zero. 
27 It is assumed that this definition is close to the Adjusted Gross Income definition of the studies from the U.S. Previous 
studies indicate that elasticity estimates are sensitive to income definitions, for instance whether estimates are based on 
taxable income or gross income definitions. Moreover, Kopczuk (2003) argues that policy makers can to some extent control 
elasticity estimates, as they depend on available deductions, and base broadening appears to have reduced elasticity estimates 
in the U.S. As elasticity estimates in the present study are discussed within the context of possible contributions to pre-tax 
income growth, it is advantageous to derive elasticity estimates with respect to gross income. 
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5.3 Results 
Elasticity estimates are obtained from two-stage least squares regressions, based on the alternative 
specifications of the dependent variable and tax change instruments. In the first stage the difference in 
the actual net-of-tax tax rates is regressed against the particular instrument of the difference in net-of-
tax rates and other exogenous variables.
28
 For each of the three alternatives results from a "taxes-only" 
variant (including mean reversion controls and variables representing time) and a specification that 
includes all exogenous variables are shown. All regressions are weighted, employing the average 
sample weights for each individual over the period 1991–99.  
 Table 4 shows net-of-tax rate elasticity estimates ranging from about 0 to about 0.17. 
Thus, these results indicate that lower marginal tax rates during the 1990s are likely to have had a 
small or no effect on income growth. The results are in accordance with the main findings in Aarbu 
and Thoresen (2001), based on information from 1991 and 1994, only. Moreover, the results do not 
indicate that there are stronger long-term effects of the reform, cf. e.g., the results from the 
specification that focus on effects of the tax reform in Table 4.
29
 However, it is worth noting that the 
only significant positive elasticity estimate is derived from the specification that allow for nonlinear 
mean reversion effects. While this elasticity estimates is smaller than reported by some U.S. studies, it 
is close to the estimate of the uncompensated elasticity with respect to broad income, reported by 
Gruber and Saez (2002, p. 16).   
 The results indicate that elasticity estimates are less sensitive with respect to the inclusion 
of other explanatory variables, as long as the mean reversion controls are included in the regressions. 
However, the regressions that include other explanatory variables help identifying which other factors 
that may have contributed to income growth.
30
 We see that the parameter for education has a 
significant, positive sign across the three specifications. This might be a sign of contributions from 
increased returns to human capital to the increased inequality in pre-tax incomes. One more year at 
school or university gives an income growth increase of near 2 per cent, as indicated by the results 
from the specifications that involve 3-year differences. Increasing returns to education have also been 
reported as a key factor behind the observed increase in wage dispersion in other countries during the 
1980s (Gottschalk and Smeeding, 1997).  
    
 
                                                     
28 F-values of the first stage of the regressions are (in general) high. 
29 Results from other regressions (not reported) that address the effect of the tax reform are in accordance with the results 
reported in Table 4.   
30 However, note that definitions of the dependent variable vary across specifications, which affect parameter values. 
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Table 4.  Two-stage least square regression results:
a)
 change in gross income as the dependent 
variable. Standard errors in parentheses  
Specification 
One difference, 1991 vs. 
average 1992–99 
Six 3-year differences, tax 
rate instruments derived 
from "permanent" inc.b) 
Six 3-year differences, 
nonlinear mean reversion 
control
 c)
 
 Taxes only 
Other 
variables 
included  
Taxes only
Other 
variables 
included  
Taxes only 
Other 
variables 
included  
Net-of-tax rate 
elasticity 
0.073 
(0.059) 
0.048 (0.055) 0.016 
(0.109) 
0.013  
(0.109) 
0.155 
(0.101) 
0.166* 
(0.101) 
Education 
 0.023*** 
(0.002) 
 0.017*** 
(0.002) 
 0.017*** 
(0.002) 
Age 
 -0.032*** 
(0.011) 
 0.007  
(0.011) 
 0.007  
(0.011) 
Age squared 
 3.9×10-4** 
(1.6×10-4) 
 -1.6×10-4 
(1.6×10-4) 
 -1.5×10-4 
(1.5×10-4) 
#children 0–3 
 -0.002 
(0.011) 
 -0.005 
(0.011) 
 0.004 
(0.011) 
#children 4–9 
 0.037*** 
(0.009) 
 -4.1×10-4 
(8.7×10-3) 
 0.003 
(0.008) 
#children 10–17 
 0.020** 
(0.009) 
 6.9×10-4 
(8.5×10-3) 
 0.112 
(0.008) 
Dummy for 
marriage 
 -0.004 
(0.014) 
 0.017  
(0.013) 
 0.004 
(0.013) 
Female dummy 
 -0.123*** 
(0.012) 
 -0.085*** 
(0.012) 
 -0.099*** 
(0.012) 
Self-employm. 
dummy 
 0.029  
(0.021) 
 -0.140*** 
(0.022) 
 -0.102*** 
(0.021) 
Net wealth 
 1.0×10-7***
(3.2×10-8) 
 9.8×10-8***
(3.3×10-8) 
 6.6×10-8**
(3.2×10-8) 
Dividend recip. 
dummy 
 0.074*** 
(0.017) 
 0.079*** 
(0.018) 
 0.055*** 
(0.017) 
Oslo-area 
dummy  
 0.065*** 
(0.012) 
 0.039*** 
(0.013) 
 0.028** 
(0.013) 
Log of first 
period income 
-0.245*** 
(0.014) 
-0.355*** 
(0.015) 
-0.172*** 
(0.012) 
-0.258*** 
(0.015) 
-0.441*** 
(0.043) 
-0.475*** 
(0.043) 
Constant 
3.115*** 
(0.173) 
4.861*** 
(0.247) 
2.139*** 
(0.157) 
3.005*** 
(0.257) 
5.393*** 
(0.508) 
5.620*** 
(0.537) 
a) In the first stage of the regression the difference in actual net-of-tax tax rates is regressed against the particular instrument 
of the difference in net-of-tax rates, and other exogenous variables. Regressions weighted by average sample weights over 
the period. 
b) Time dummy variables included. 
c) Time dummy variables and 10-piece spline function included.  
*significant at 0.10 level, **significant at 0.05 level, ***significant at 0.01 level  
 
 
 Since dividend payments rose during the 1990s from about 1,5 billion NOK in 1991 to 
about 19 billion NOK in 1999, capital income has been seen as a major factor behind widening income 
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inequality.
31
 The results confirm that ownership of shares at an early stage of the period has been 
advantageous, as the dividend recipient dummy is positive. Similarly, the sign for the wealth variable 
indicate that prosperity in the beginning of the period has contributed positively to income growth. 
 The results also indicate that place of residence affects income growth, as the Oslo-area 
dummy variable, that covers individuals living in the capital and the neighboring municipalities, has a 
positive sign. This may be due to the macroeconomic upswing that set in shortly after the 1992 tax 
reform (Statistics Norway, 1999), inasmuch enhanced macroeconomic performance is believed to 
affect on residents in urban areas first, at least initially. It is also worth noting that females do worse 
than males in the period. 
6. Conclusion 
Although the inequality in pre-tax income has widened, the tax burden concentration remains largely 
the same for the period 1991–99. This implies that the level of tax progressivity has declined in the 
period. The main purpose of this analysis has been to assess the possible contributions of tax changes 
in the period to this decline. Individual data from income tax returns were utilized.   
 While Auten and Carroll (1999) find that tax-driven behavioral adjustments contributed 
to relative income growth in the U.S. in the late 1980s, the effects appear to be somewhat smaller with 
respect to the Norwegian case in the 1990s. Estimates of the net-of-tax rate elasticities range from 0 to 
approximately 0.2, which implies that the net-of-tax rate changes have had a limited or no effect on 
pre-tax income growth. These estimates are close to previous findings, reported in Aarbu and 
Thoresen (2001). The regression analysis also identified other variables that have contributed to 
growth in pre-tax incomes, as education and ownership of shares early in the period.     
 One important feature of the present approach is that it identifies the tax changes that 
would have counteracted the observed trend. Methodologically, this is done by keeping the pre-tax 
income distribution fixed and exposing it to various tax-laws in the period. For instance, if policy-
makers have increased the value of standard deductions at the same rate as real wage growth in the 
period, the tax system would have been more progressive. We can therefore say that the current 
analysis should improve the information available to policy-makers aiming at offsetting the trend 
towards reduced tax progressivity. 
 There may well be other responses to tax system alterations not discussed in the present 
study. For instance, the lack of reliable data has so far prevented us from looking at organizational 
form adjustments in response to the dual income tax system, for instance that self-employed taxpayers 
                                                     
31 Capital income is also an important source of income for the affluent in the U.S. (Slemrod, 1994).  
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may have decided to organize their activities in a company with themselves as shareholders and 
employees. One hypothesis worth pursuing is that taxpayers minimize the tax burden by choosing an 
organizational form that avoids the impact of the split model. Such behavior might help explain the 
absence of increased tax burdens for the well-off in response to the widened pre-tax income inequality.   
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Appendix 
Table A1.  Tax progressivity measured by disproportionality and the redistributive effect, 1991–
99. Alternative definition of tax burden 
 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
1991–99 
(%) 
Inequality in pre-tax 
income, GX 
0.276 0.281 0.289 0.298 0.293 0.304 0.307 0.299 0.300 +8.2 
Tax burden 
concentration, 
X
T
γ  
0.417 0.420 0.431 0.437 0.431 0.439 0.441 0.430 0.435 +4.3 
Inequality in post-tax 
income, GY 
0.235 0.242 0.247 0.254 0.249 0.259 0.262 0.254 0.255 +8.4 
Redistributive effect, 
ΠR 
0.041 0.039 0.042 0.044 0.045 0.045 0.045 0.044 0.044 +7.0 
Disproportionality, 
ΠD 
0.141 0.140 0.142 0.140 0.138 0.135 0.134 0.131 0.136 -3.4 
 
  
